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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to evaluate a risk-managed momentum strategy in the European stock 
market. The recent performance of momentum in Europe is first evaluated. A momentum 
premium still exists in Europe but the strategy suffered large losses in 2009. A risk-managed 
momentum portfolio is created by dynamically scaling the exposure to momentum based on a 
monthly volatility forecast. The risk-managed strategy is evaluated by comparing its 
performance to the original momentum portfolio. Risk management doubles the Sharpe ratio 
of the momentum portfolio and reduces tail risk. The greatest benefit of risk management comes 
from avoiding momentum crashes. The strategy increases the Sharpe ratio in all subsamples 
and the results are robust in international markets. 
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1 Introduction 
Momentum has received considerable attention in the literature ever since first documented in 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993). Momentum is the general tendency for rising asset prices to 
continue rising and falling prices to continue falling. Buying stocks that have performed well 
in the past and selling stocks that have performed poorly has historically provided large returns. 
The sources of momentum profits are still not fully understood. Controlling for risk with 
traditional asset pricing models such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) or the three-
factor model of Fama and French (1992) give significantly positive abnormal returns. 
Momentum might therefore seem like an attractive strategy for investors. 
Although momentum has historically been a profitable strategy, more recent studies have 
highlighted the negative aspects of momentum. A left-skewed return distribution and high 
excess kurtosis makes the strategy vulnerable to crashes. The performance of momentum in the 
last decade is not particularly impressive. The strategy suffered large losses in 2009 - persistent 
losses that have never been regained. Because of these findings, the latest research has focused 
on the phenomenon of momentum crashes. Just like the name suggests, a momentum crash is 
an event where the momentum strategy fails and loses a large part of its value in a matter of 
months. 
To address the issue of tail risk in momentum, Barroso & Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel & 
Moskowitz (2016) have proposed modified versions of momentum, where the exposure to 
momentum is dynamically scaled every month. By dynamically scaling the exposure to 
momentum, they manage to take advantage of the profitability of momentum while minimizing 
the tail risk. The Sharpe ratio is doubled and momentum crashes are avoided. 
The aim of this essay is to test the risk-managed momentum strategy of Barroso & Santa-Clara 
(2015) using a European stock portfolio between 1991:03 and 2017:06. Their study focuses on 
a US equity portfolio between 1926 and 2013. The main contribution of this essay is therefore 
to test if the risk-managed strategy works well in international markets (specifically, Europe). 
Furthermore, since my essay uses a shorter sample period, the analysis will be more focused on 
the recent performance of the strategy. While Barroso & Santa-Clara (2015) have the advantage 
of a longer sample period, their analysis is more general and less focused on the recent 
performance of the strategy. Naturally, this essay will also contribute to the discussion on 
momentum crashes in Europe and the recent performance of momentum. 
6 
 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
momentum and momentum crashes. Section 3 presents the data and describes the methodology 
used in the essay. Section 4 presents the results together with an analysis of the results. Finally, 
Section 5 ends the essay with a conclusion. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Momentum 
De Bondt & Thaler (1985) find empirical evidence for overreaction in stock markets. According 
to the overreaction hypothesis, if investors systematically overreact to new information, then 
stock prices should increase (decrease) dramatically following good (bad) news, causing the 
price to differ from its fundamental value. A dramatic movement of price in either direction 
will in the long run be corrected, which leads to a return reversal in the opposite direction. De 
Bondt & Thaler form portfolios by sorting stocks based on returns in the past 36 months (the 
formation period) and construct portfolios of “past winners” and “past losers” by selecting the 
stocks with the highest prior returns and lowest prior returns in the formation period. Portfolios 
of past losers outperform the market, while portfolios of past winners earn returns below the 
market returns, 36 months after portfolio formation. In other words, they find evidence for long-
term reversal of stock prices. The difference is biggest in the second and third year after 
formation. Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) find similar return-reversals at the short (1-
week to 1-month) horizon. Contrarian strategies where stocks are selected based on returns in 
the past week or month outperform the market. The strategy however is transaction intensive, 
and the abnormal returns are likely due to other factors than overreaction (Jegadeesh & Titman, 
1993).  
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) find a momentum effect at the medium (3- to 12-month) horizon. 
They construct portfolios by sorting stocks based on their returns in the past 3- to 12-months 
and ranking them in deciles. A “winner minus loser” portfolio is then constructed by buying 
the stocks in the top (“past winners”) decile and selling stocks in the bottom (“past losers”) 
decile. The winner minus loser portfolio generates significant returns over 3- to 12-month 
holding periods. The returns of the portfolio partly dissipate in the following 2 years after the 
holding period, i.e. there is a return reversal in the long run. The returns of the momentum 
portfolio cannot be explained by its systematic risk. 
Carhart (1997) finds that common factors in stock returns and transaction costs almost 
completely explain the short-term performance of mutual funds. The hot hands effect in mutual 
funds, the notion that mutual funds that have performed well in the past are more likely to 
perform well in the future, is likely due to the one-year momentum effect, according to him. 
The reason for this is not because fund managers deliberately follow momentum strategies, but 
because some mutual funds just happen to hold large positions in last year’s winning stocks, he 
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argues. Carhart introduces a four-factor model to explain returns, which is based on the three 
Fama and French (1992) factors plus a new momentum factor.  
The profitability of momentum strategies is not exclusive to the US. Rouwenhorst (1998) finds 
that an internationally diversified portfolio of European stocks that follows a momentum 
strategy earns approximately 1 percent per month. The momentum effect is present in all 12 
markets of the sample.  Momentum is not unique to developed markets - emerging stock 
markets exhibit momentum as well (Rouwenhorst, 1999). In a sample of 41 countries from 
around the world, Chui et al (2010) found momentum to be profitable in all but four of the 
countries. Fama & French (2012) show that there is a momentum premium in international 
portfolios of the regions North America, Europe and Asia Pacific. Neither is momentum 
exclusive to equity markets. Evidence for the momentum effect has been found in currency 
markets (Okunev & White, 2003) and commodities (Erb & Harvey, 2006). 
3.2 Explanations for momentum 
The profitability of momentum strategies across a diverse range of markets, time samples and 
asset classes is well established. However, there has been some debate on the source of profits 
and the interpretation of the results. Momentum has on one hand been considered as evidence 
for market inefficiency, while others have argued that the returns may be due to a compensation 
for risk. To investigate whether exposure to market risk can explain momentum profits, 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) adjust for risk using the CAPM. Fama & French (1996) adjust for 
risk using the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model. Both cases give significantly positive 
alpha-values, meaning that traditional risk factors cannot explain the profits of momentum 
strategies. Conrad & Kaul (1998) find that cross-sectional variability in stock returns can 
explain the returns of momentum strategies. Jegadeesh & Titman (2002), however argue that 
these conclusions are wrongly made due to a small sample bias. An unbiased test shows that 
cross-sectional variability in stock returns explain little to none of momentum returns. Grundy 
& Martin (2001) argue that the positive mean return of momentum cannot be explained by the 
exposure to a conditional Fama and French three-factor model, nor by unconditional cross-
sectional variability in stock returns or exposure to industry factors.  
Traditional asset pricing models are not able to explain momentum profits. Instead, the 
empirical evidence on momentum seem to provide support in favor of behavioral theories 
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 2001). Daniel et al (1998) propose a behavioral theory based on investor 
overconfidence and biased self-attribution. The authors assume that overconfidence in investors 
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causes them to overvalue their own private information, which leads to medium-run momentum 
effects and long-run return reversal effects in the stock market. To explain the causes of 
underreaction and overreaction, Barberis et al (1998) propose a behavioral model of how 
investors form beliefs. Hong & Stein (1999) offer a theory of underreaction and overreaction 
based on the way traders interact with each other on the market. Gervais & Odeon (2001) 
investigate the various aspects of investor overconfidence and the causes for it. According to 
their model, investors assess their ability from failures and successes. Investors with previous 
successes give too much credit for their successes when assessing their ability. As a result, they 
become overconfident.  
The behavioral theory can be extended to predict differences in momentum profits across 
different market states. According to the theory, investor overconfidence increases when market 
returns are high, resulting in stronger momentum returns during bull markets. Cooper et al 
(2004) show that the profitability of the momentum strategy depends on the market state. Two 
market states are defined based on the lagged three-year market return. The average monthly 
momentum return is 0.93% when the lagged three-year market return is positive and -0.37% 
when the lagged three-year market return is negative. Chordia & Shivakumar (2002) show that 
momentum returns are explained by common macroeconomic variables that are related to the 
business cycle. They find that momentum returns are positive during economic expansions and 
negative during recessions. Griffin, Ji & Martin (2003), however find that conditional 
macroeconomic risks cannot explain momentum returns in international markets. Stivers & Sun 
(2010) find a negative relation between the return dispersion of the market and future 
momentum returns. When studying the effect of market cycles on momentum and contrarian 
strategies, Stivers & Sun (2013) find that the profits of these strategies are higher in up- and 
down-market states, but much lower in transitions between the two market states.  
3.3 Momentum crashes 
Jegadeesh & Titman (2011) follow up their studies from 1993 and 2001 by testing the 
performance of a momentum portfolio from 1990 to 2009. They find that although the 
momentum effect has continued after the 1990’s, the effect has diminished over time. The most 
recent period saw low returns for the momentum portfolio, especially in 2009 when the 
portfolio suffered a loss of 36.5%. The beta value of the momentum portfolio was -.79 in 2009, 
while the beta was usually close to zero on average the rest of the years. The losses for the 
momentum portfolio in 2009 can partly be explained by the negative beta of the portfolio in 
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2009. Jegadeesh & Titman find that together with the portfolio beta, the lagged three-year 
market return and the market return dispersion can explain a large part of the negative 
momentum returns in 2009.  
Daniel & Moskowitz (2016) provide an in-depth discussion of momentum crashes, events 
where momentum strategies suffer persistent strings of large negative returns. They argue that 
momentum crashes are partly forecastable. These happen in panic states, following market 
declines and in volatile periods. They also discuss the time-varying beta of the momentum 
portfolio and how it relates to momentum crashes. In bear markets, the beta of the loser portfolio 
increases, which makes the beta of the momentum portfolio negative. This is because past 
winners tend to be lower beta stocks during market recessions, and past losers tend to be higher 
beta stocks during market recessions. They show that momentum crashes do not occur because 
the winner portfolio crashes, but rather because the loser portfolio dramatically increases in 
value during market rebounds. Since the momentum strategy involves buying winners and 
selling losers, the strategy crashes when the loser portfolio jumps in value. A dynamic 
momentum strategy based on forecasts of the portfolio’s mean and variance is tested. The 
strategy doubles the Sharpe ratio of the static momentum strategy and virtually eliminates the 
risk for momentum crashes.  
Barroso & Santa-Clara (2015) explain that momentum strategies give rise to negative skewness 
and higher kurtosis compared to the market portfolio. They show that the risk of momentum 
fluctuates over time and that it is partly forecastable.  A risk-managed momentum strategy is 
tested where the weight invested in the winner minus loser portfolio is dynamically changed 
every month depending on the forecasted variance of the portfolio. The objective of the strategy 
is to keep portfolio volatility relatively constant over time and greatly reduce the probability of 
large unexpected losses. The strategy doubles the Sharpe ratio of the static momentum strategy 
and reduces the kurtosis and the skewness of the return distribution.  
The research that is closest to my paper are the studies of Barroso & Santa-Clara (2015) and 
Daniel & Moskowitz (2016). 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Data description 
All data used in this paper is obtained from Kenneth French’s data library. The dataset contains 
the monthly and daily returns for portfolios of stocks from 16 developed European stock 
markets from January 1991 to June 2017. The stocks are sorted into five size groups based on 
market equity value. Each size group is then subdivided into five (momentum) quintiles based 
on prior returns, with an equal number of stocks in each quintile. The first size group consists 
of the largest stocks in the sample that together make up 90% of the market’s total equity value. 
The stocks in the first (biggest) size group are therefore the most representative of the market. 
In this paper, I have only looked at the largest stocks, i.e. only the first size group. For the 
momentum portfolios, all stocks in each respective size group are ranked in ascending order 
according to their returns from month t-12 to t-2. It is customary to skip the month between the 
formation period and the holding period, t-1, because of the short-term reversal effect showed 
by Jegadeesh (1990). The highest (winner) quintile is then the portfolio with the top 20 percent 
of stocks, and the lowest (loser) quintile is the group with the bottom 20 percent of stocks. The 
momentum portfolios are readjusted every month using the same procedure. The individual 
stocks are value-weighted in each portfolio. All returns are in US dollars.  
3.2 Method 
In this paper, I have followed the same procedure as Barroso & Santa-Clara (2015). First the 
winner minus loser portfolio is created, and then the risk-managed momentum portfolio is 
created by scaling the weight of the winner minus loser portfolio. Momentum is a zero-cost 
strategy which involves buying stocks with the highest prior returns and selling stocks with the 
lowest prior returns. The returns for the momentum portfolio are therefore calculated by taking 
the portfolio returns of the stocks in the highest quintile (past winners) and subtracting them 
with the portfolio returns of the stocks in the lowest quintile (past losers): 
 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑊,𝑡 − 𝑟𝐿,𝑡,                                                                                                                                  (1) 
where 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 is the return of the winner minus loser portfolio (WML) at time t, 𝑟𝑊,𝑡 is the return 
of the winner portfolio at time t, and 𝑟𝐿,𝑡 is the return of the loser portfolio at time t. This is done 
with both monthly and daily returns.  
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To test if the Fama and French (1992) risk factors can explain the positive average returns of 
the WML portfolio, I run the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression: 
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑟𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑟𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,                                                              (2) 
where 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 is the return for the WML-portfolio at time t, 𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑡 is the return for the market 
risk factor at time t, 𝑟𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 is the return for the size factor at time t and 𝑟𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡 is the return for 
the value factor at time t.  
For each month, I compute the realized variance of the WML portfolio, 𝑅𝑉𝑡 ,  from daily returns 
in the previous 21 daily sessions. The realized variance for month t is the sum of squared returns 
for the daily returns of month t: 
 𝑅𝑉𝑡 = ∑ 𝑟ⅆ𝑡−𝑗
2
20
𝑗=0
,                                                                                                                                    (3) 
where 𝑟ⅆ𝑡−𝑗  are the daily returns of the WML portfolio in month t.  
An Autoregressive model of order 1 (AR(1)) is estimated, where 𝑅𝑉𝑡 is regressed by the lagged 
realized variance, 𝑅𝑉𝑡−1, and a constant: 
𝑅𝑉𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑅𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                                      (4) 
The AR(1) model is estimated to measure the degree of persistence in the volatility of the 
momentum portfolio, and how well the realized variance is explained by its lag.  
The forecasted variance of month t, σ̂𝑡
2
 is equal to the previous months’ realized variance,     
RVt.-1: 
σ̂𝑡
2 = RV𝑡−1 =  ∑ 𝑟ⅆ𝑡−1−𝑗
2
20
𝑗=0
                                                                                                                                                                          (5)                                                       
Barroso & Santa-Clara (2016) use the 6-month realized variances as their variance forecast, but 
they also tested using one-month realized variances and three-month realized variances, and an 
exponentially moving average model with different half-lives. All of them worked well with 
almost identical results. Therefore, I chose the simplest variance forecast model of one-month 
realized variances. A more sophisticated variance model could potentially improve the variance 
forecast very slightly, but the results would most likely be the same.  
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The annualized volatility forecast, ?̂?𝑡, is calculated by taking the square root of the monthly 
variance forecast, σ̂𝑡
2, and multiplying by √12: 
?̂?𝑡 = √σ̂𝑡
2 ∗ √12                                                                                                                                             (6) 
The risk managed momentum returns are obtained by scaling the returns of the WML portfolio. 
The momentum returns are scaled by the ratio between a fixed target volatility and the 
forecasted volatility for month t:  
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡∗ =  
𝜎𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
?̂?𝑡
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡,                                                                                                                                (7) 
where 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡∗  is the return for the risk managed momentum portfolio (WML*) at time t, 𝜎𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
is the annualized volatility target and ?̂?𝑡 is the annualized volatility forecast of month t. 
𝜎𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
?̂?𝑡
 
is the weight invested in the WML portfolio. Conceptually, if a weight of 1 represents a 1$ 
long/1$ short investment in the WML portfolio, then a weight of 2 represents a 2$ long/2$ short 
investment in the WML portfolio, and so on. Since momentum is a zero-cost strategy where the 
long position is offset by the short position, there are no weight constraints.  
12% per year is chosen as the annual volatility target, because this is the same as the average 
yearly market volatility. The target volatility can of course be increased or decreased depending 
on the investor’s risk preference. A higher volatility target leads to higher expected returns at 
the cost of higher volatility, and a lower volatility target leads to lower volatility at the cost of 
lower expected returns. 
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4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 European equity momentum 
The results show that there is a momentum premium in the European equity market over the 
last quarter century. When stocks are sorted into quintile portfolios based on prior returns, the 
past winners (quintile 5) earn considerably higher average excess returns than past losers 
(quintile 1). Table 1 presents the summary statistics of returns for the five momentum quintile 
portfolios over this period. The winner portfolio earns an average excess return of 8.51% per 
year while the loser portfolio earns an average excess return of only 2.03% per year. The 
difference between past winners’ and past losers’ average returns is slightly higher than the 
average excess market return, which is 6.29% per year. Figure 1 plots the cumulative returns of 
the highest and the lowest quintile portfolios in the full sample period. 
Table 1 
Summary statistics of monthly returns for the momentum quintile portfolios sorted on prior returns from 
1991:03 to 2017:06. The average excess return, the standard deviation and the alpha are annualized and 
in percent. The beta- and alpha values are estimated by running an OLS regression using the full sample 
data.  
 
Portfolio 1  
(lowest) 
2 3 4 5 
(highest) 
WML Market 
Excess 
average 
return 
2.03 5.45 7.08 7.61 8.51 6.48 6.29 
Standard 
deviation 
25.4 19.0 16.5 16.3 18.5 21.3 16.9 
Alpha 
(t-statistic) 
-6.32 
(-2.73) 
-1.18 
(-0.92) 
1.18 
(1.36) 
1.98 
(1.68) 
2.74 
(1.38) 
9.07 
(2.29) 
0 
 
Beta 1.33 1.05 0.94 0.89 0.92 -0.41 1 
Sharpe ratio 0.172 0.410 0.572 0.613 0.588 0.304 0.372 
 
The momentum premium is not as strong as in Barroso & Santa-Clara (2015) or Daniel & 
Moskowitz (2016), but this suggests that the momentum premium has weakened in recent 
decades which is consistent with Jegadeesh & Titman (2011). Alternatively, it suggests that the 
momentum premium is smaller for large cap stocks which is consistent with Fama and French 
(2012). Finally, it could also suggest that the momentum premium is slightly smaller in Europe 
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than in the US. The average loser portfolio beta is 1.33, much higher than the average winner 
portfolio beta, which is 0.92. The average beta-value of the winner-minus-loser portfolio is 
therefore negative, -0.41. This is consistent with the findings of Daniel & Moskowitz (2016). 
The average abnormal yearly return of the winner minus loser portfolio is 9.07% when 
controlled for market risk using the CAPM. Exposure to market risk can therefore not explain 
the positive average returns of momentum. 
Fig. 1. Past winners and past losers, 1991-2017. Plotted are the cumulative returns for the top quintile 
“past winner” portfolio and the bottom quintile “past loser” portfolio, together with the market portfolio 
from 1991:01 to 2017:06. 
Running an OLS regression of the WML on the three Fama and French factors (see Eq.2) gives 
the following estimates (t-statistics in parenthesis):  
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 = 0.936 − 0.340𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑡 + 0.127𝑟𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 − 0.634𝑟𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡               
                                             (2.91)    (−5.07)               (0.880)          (−4.78),                                (8) 
where the returns are in percent. Controlling for the Fama and French factors, the abnormal 
return of the WML is 0.936% per month, or 11.2% per annum. The WML is negatively 
correlated with both the market and the value factor. The exposures are very similar to the ones 
of the American momentum portfolio in Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015). The WML has a small 
positive exposure to the size factor (but the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant). 
The profitability of the momentum portfolio is left unexplained by the three-factor model. In 
fact, since the momentum portfolio has a negative loading on both the market risk factor and 
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the value factor, the abnormal return given by the three-factor model is even greater than the 
raw momentum return. 
 
Fig. 2. Momentum in the 2000’s. Plotted are the cumulative returns for the winner minus loser portfolio 
(WML) and the market portfolio minus the risk free rate (RMRF), from 2000:01 to 2009:12.  
Figure 2 shows the cumulative returns for the WML and the market in the most turbulent 
subsample period 2000-2009. The drawbacks of the momentum strategy are clear when 
examining the performance of the WML in the 2000’s. The WML suffers from severe 
momentum crashes in the 2000’s. The year 2000 saw such an episode, but the most serious 
crash came in 2009. This is the momentum crash I will focus my discussion on. An invested 
dollar in the WML in the beginning of 2000 is worth less than a dollar a decade later because 
of the crash. The losses from the crash are persistent, in the sense that the losses are never fully 
regained during the full sample period (see Fig. 6.). A wrong timed investment in the WML can 
become a costly affair.  
The existing literature on momentum crashes suggests that these occur in times following 
market declines, market rebounds and in times of high market volatility. When analyzing the 
momentum crash of 2009 in the US equity market, Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) show that the 
momentum portfolio’s downfall was due to the short-side of the strategy. Similarly, Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2011) show that the momentum portfolio had a negative beta in 2009. During the 
market rebound of 2009, the past losers quickly gained in value, much more than the past 
winners. Since the winner minus loser portfolio sells the past losers, the portfolio suffers a loss 
when the past losers outperform the past winners. Similarly, if the beta of the winner minus 
loser portfolio is negative, then the portfolio suffers a loss when the market rebounds. Not 
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surprisingly, this is what happened in the European winner minus loser portfolio in 2009. The 
portfolio made large gains up until 2009, even a year after the market started to crash. However, 
coinciding with the market rebound of 2009, the portfolio crashed. The winner minus loser 
portfolio lost 46% of its value in just three months. Figure 3 shows that the past losers 
completely outperformed the past winners in 2009. Therefore, the crash of the WML was due 
to the short-side of the portfolio. The WML had a beta-value of -1.11 in 2009, which is much 
lower than its full-sample average. Consistent with Jegadeesh & Titman (2011) and Daniel & 
Moskowitz (2016), the WML had a strongly negative beta in 2009 due to an increased loser 
portfolio beta and a decreased winner portfolio beta.  
 
Fig. 3. Past winners and past losers, 2009-2011. Plotted are the cumulative returns for the top quintile 
“past winners” portfolio and the bottom quintile “past losers” portfolio along with the market portfolio 
from 2009:03 to 2011:03. 
The evident riskiness of the momentum strategy in the 2000s raises the question if momentum 
is still a sound investment strategy. The empirical findings suggest that it was a poor strategy 
in the 2000’s. Investors looking for less risky strategies can therefore either leave momentum 
altogether, or utilize modified momentum strategies in the spirit of Barrosso & Santa-Clara 
(2015) and Daniel & Moskowitz (2016).  Barrosso & Santa-Clara employ a simple 
modification, with strong results. Since research on momentum has shown that the momentum 
portfolio performs worse after times of high market volatility, it seems obvious to take volatility 
into consideration. Their modification involves scaling the weight of the winner minus loser 
portfolio up or down depending on the trailing volatility of the portfolio. They show that the 
volatility of momentum is forecastable, and scaling the portfolio based on trailing volatility 
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improves the portfolio’s mean return, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. The risk for 
momentum crashes is virtually eliminated.  
I employed the same strategy as Barroso & Santa-Clara (2015) because of the simplicity and 
intuitiveness of the strategy. Figure 4 shows the time-varying nature of volatility for the WML 
portfolio. There seems to be a relation between volatility and performance for the WML. For 
example, the calm 1990s seem to have yielded stable returns for the WML portfolio. Whereas, 
the volatility peaks in 2000 and 2009 were followed by large downturns.  
   
Fig. 4. Monthly realized variances of the WML portfolio, 1991-2017. Plotted are the annualized monthly 
realized variances of the winner minus loser portfolio from 1991:03 to 2017:06. 
The estimates (and t-statistics) from running an AR(1) regression of the realized variance on its 
lag and a constant (see Eq.4) are:  
𝑅𝑉𝑡 = 0.0289 + 0.826𝑅𝑉𝑡−1 
                                                                    (4.36)       (25.9),                                                                (9) 
with 𝑅2  =  0.682. The relatively high AR(1) coefficient of 0.826 means that there is a high 
degree of persistence in the risk of momentum. Months of increased volatility are clustered. 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) show that the risk of momentum is more persistent than the 
risk of the market. They find that forecasting momentum volatility with lagged realized variance 
yields reliable results in an out-of-sample test. Finally, they show that there is a negative relation 
between the realized variance of momentum and returns. These factors suggest that the strategy 
employed by Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) is reasonable to employ. 
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Because of the fluctuating nature of the portfolio’s volatility, along with the fact that momentum 
volatility is forecastable, it is natural to scale the weight of the momentum portfolio based on a 
trailing volatility factor. As target volatility, I use an annualized volatility of 12% because this 
is the average market volatility for the entire sample. The weight of the portfolio increases 
above 1 if the trailing volatility is lower than the target volatility, and decreases below 1 if the 
trailing volatility is above the target volatility. Since the momentum portfolio is a zero-
investment portfolio, the weight in the portfolio can increase above 1. The intuition is simple: 
during volatile periods, we take a smaller position in the momentum portfolio. During calmer 
periods, we take a larger position in the momentum portfolio. Figure 5 shows the weight of the 
momentum portfolio as it changes over time. The weight on the WML takes on values ranging 
between 0.13 and 2.74. Note how large the weight is in most of the 90s and mid-2000’s, and 
how small it is in the early 2000s and in 2008-2009.  
 
Fig. 5. Weight invested in the WML portfolio, 1991-2017. Plotted are the weights invested in the static 
winner minus loser portfolio to form the scaled winner minus loser portfolio from 1991:03 to 2017:03. 
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4.2 Risk-managed momentum 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of returns for the static momentum portfolio, the risk 
managed momentum portfolio and the market risk factor in the full sample period. The WML 
is a risky strategy: the standard deviation is higher than for the market and the kurtosis is much 
higher. Extreme values are therefore more likely in the WML. The risk-managed momentum 
portfolio performs considerably better than the static momentum portfolio. The average return 
of the risk managed momentum portfolio is 9.49% with a standard deviation of 15.3%. The 
static momentum portfolio averages only 6.48% per year, with a standard deviation of 21.3%. 
Risk management doubles the Sharpe ratio, from the static momentum portfolio’s 0.304 to the 
risk-managed momentum portfolio’s 0.620. The higher moments of returns: skewness and 
kurtosis, are greatly improved. Both the market’s and the static momentum portfolio’s return 
distributions are heavily skewed to the left, while the risk-managed momentum portfolio’s 
return distribution is very symmetric. The risks associated with momentum crashes are 
drastically reduced with the risk-managed strategy. The maximum loss in a single month for 
the static momentum portfolio is 33.2%. For the risk-managed momentum portfolio, the 
maximum single month loss is 18.6%. These results are very similar to the results of Barroso 
& Santa Clara (2015), whose risk-managed momentum portfolio in the US doubled the Sharpe 
ratio when compared to the static momentum portfolio. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of monthly returns for the winner minus loser portfolio (WML), the scaled 
winner minus loser portfolio (WML*) and the market portfolio minus risk free rate (RMRF), from 
1991:03 to 2017:06. The maximum, the minimum, the mean and the standard deviation are in percent. 
The mean, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio are annualized.  
Portfolio WML WML* RMRF 
Mean 6.48 9.49 6.29 
Standard deviation 21.3 15.3 16.9 
Maximum 23.3 16.9 13.8 
Minimum -33.2 -18.6  -22.1 
Skewness -0.590 0.0470 -0.576 
Excess Kurtosis 4.32 1.61 1.71 
Sharpe ratio 0.304 0.620 0.372 
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Fig. 6. WML and WML*, 1991-2017. Plotted are the cumulative returns of the static winner minus loser 
portfolio, (WML), scaled winner minus loser portfolio (WML*) and the market minus risk free rate 
portfolio (RMRF) from 1991:03 to 2017:06.  
Figure 6 shows the cumulative returns of the WML, the WML* and the market risk factor 
during the full sample period. A dollar invested in the WML* at the start of the sample period 
is worth 8.88 dollars at the end of the sample period, compared to 2.97 dollars for the WML 
and 3.57 dollars for the market portfolio. It is interesting to compare the static momentum 
portfolio to the risk-managed momentum portfolio around the momentum crash of 2009. The 
value of the regular momentum portfolio peaks in 2009 just before the crash, then plummets 
and never returns to its peak value. The risk-managed momentum portfolio also loses some of 
its value in the same months of 2009, but the losses are not nearly as big as for the static 
momentum portfolio. Moreover, the losses are regained relatively quickly, and new highs are 
reached just a few years after the losses. The downside risk of the momentum strategy is greatly 
reduced with risk management. The modification also manages to catch some upside in the 
mid-to-late 1990s by increasing the weight in the momentum portfolio during calmer periods, 
resulting in larger gains. 
To test how the risk-managed momentum strategy performs in different market conditions, I 
have divided the full sample into three smaller subsamples. The first subsample (1991-1999) 
represents a calm period without any market crashes, the second subsample (2000-2009) 
represents the most volatile period with two major market crashes and the third subsample 
(2010-2007) represents a post-crash period. The WML performed well in the first subsample 
with a Sharpe ratio of 0.739, extremely poorly in the second subsample (2000-2009) and 
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average in the third subsample (2010-2017). Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the WML 
and the WML* in the three subsamples. 
Table 3. Summary statistics of monthly returns for the static winner-minus-loser portfolio (WML) and 
the scaled winner-minus-loser portfolio (WML*) over the three subsamples: 1991-1999, 2000-2009 and 
2010-2017. The mean, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio are annualized. The maximum, the 
minimum, the mean and the standard deviation are in percent. 
Subsample 1991:03-1999:12 2000:01-2009:12 2010:01-2017:06 
Portfolio WML WML* WML WML* WML WML* 
Mean 11.3 15.6 2.05 6.34 6.77 6.45 
Standard 
deviation 
15.3 17.8 28.1 14.3 16.6 13.4 
Maximum 16.8 16.9 23.3 11.7 13.6 12.4 
Minimum -16.6 -18.6 -33.2 -12.7 -12.5 -12.3 
Skewness 0.0118 0.0472 -0.565 -0.0349 -0.167 -0.152 
Excess Kurtosis 3.50 1.76 2.56 0.58 0.22 1.00 
Sharpe ratio 0.739 0.876 0.0730 0.443 0.408 0.481 
 
Not surprisingly, the biggest gain from the risk-managed momentum portfolio comes in the 
second subsample. The mean return is tripled and the standard deviation is halved. The 
skewness and kurtosis of the return distribution is improved. The maximum loss decreased from 
33.2% to 12.7%. The results show that the risk-managed momentum portfolio provides the 
biggest benefit in times of high volatility, especially when momentum crashes occur. Figure 7 
shows the cumulative returns of the static momentum portfolio and the risk-managed 
momentum portfolio in the turbulent 2000s. The static momentum portfolio ends the decade 
down 19% because of the crash in 2009. The risk-managed momentum portfolio ends the 
decade 70% up as it manages to avoid the largest losses in the crash and preserve some of the 
positive returns in 2007-2008. The risk-managed portfolio performed well in the first subsample 
as well. The mean return is increased from 11.3% to 15.6%, although the standard deviation 
also increases, from 15.3% to 17.8%. Excess kurtosis is reduced from 3.50 to 1.76. The risk-
managed portfolio therefore also offers an improvement in calm periods by increasing the mean 
return. The situation is less clear in the most recent subsample. The Sharpe ratio does improve, 
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but not by much, from 0.408 to 0.481. The risk-managed portfolio has more excess kurtosis 
however, 1.00 compared to 0.22 for the static momentum portfolio. The return distribution of 
the risk-managed momentum portfolio is more skewed in the third subsample compared to the 
first and the second subsample, which suggests that risk management was unsuccessful in the 
third subsample.  
 
Fig. 7. WML and WML* in the 2000’s. Plotted are the cumulative returns of the static momentum 
portfolio (WML) and the risk-managed momentum portfolio from 2000:01 to 2009:12. 
To test if the risk-managed strategy offers benefits in international equity markets, I have tested 
the strategy in the regions North America (USA and Canada) and Asia Pacific (Australia, New 
Zealand, Singapore and Hong Kong). The data was obtained from Kenneth French’s data 
library. The risk-managed momentum portfolios in these regions were created using the exact 
same procedure as the European risk-managed momentum portfolio. An annualized target 
volatility of 14% was used for North America and 20% for Asia Pacific, since these correspond 
to the respective region’s average market volatility over the full sample period. Table 4 and 5 
show the summary statistics of the WML and the WML* in North America and Asia Pacific.  
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Table 4. Summary statistics of monthly returns for the static winner minus loser portfolio (WML), the 
scaled winner minus loser portfolio (WML*) and the market portfolio minus risk free rate (RMRF), in 
North America from 1991:03 to 2017:06. The mean, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio are 
annualized. The maximum, the minimum, the mean and the standard deviation are in percent. 
Portfolio WML WML* RMRF 
Mean 7.05 8.70 8.00 
Standard deviation 22.9 17.7 14.5 
Maximum 35.8 18.1 11.5 
Minimum -30.1 -16.0 -18.4 
Skewness -0.0172 0.135 -0.734 
Excess Kurtosis 5.34 0.79 1.75 
Sharpe ratio 0.308 0.492 0.552 
 
The performance of the winner minus loser portfolio is similar in the North American and the 
European market. Just like in Europe, the WML is a risky portfolio with higher levels of 
volatility and kurtosis than the market. The main difference is that the return distribution of the 
WML is less skewed in North America than in Europe. The benefits from the risk-managed 
strategy are large. The strategy increases the yearly average return from 7.05% to 8.70%, and 
decreases the standard deviation from 22.9% to 17.7% when compared to the static momentum 
strategy. The Sharpe ratio improves from 0.308 to 0.492. Excess kurtosis is greatly reduced, 
from 5.34 to 0.79. The maximum single month loss decreases from 30.1% for the static 
momentum portfolio to 16.0% for the risk-managed momentum portfolio. The strategy does 
not outperform the market risk factor based on the Sharpe ratio, due to a higher standard 
deviation. But the strategy does give a return distribution that is less skewed than the market, 
and with less kurtosis.  
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Table 5. Summary statistics of monthly returns for the static winner minus loser portfolio (WML), the 
scaled winner minus loser portfolio (WML*) and the market portfolio minus risk free rate (RMRF) in 
Asia Pacific from 1991:03 to 2017:06. The mean, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio are 
annualized. The maximum, the minimum, the mean and the standard deviation are in percent. 
Portfolio WML WML* RMRF 
Mean 1.75 10.1 8.94 
Standard deviation 25.6 25.5 20.5 
Maximum 26.1 25.0 20.5 
Minimum -57.3 -32.9 -26.1 
Skewness -1.78 -0.214 -0.378 
Excess Kurtosis 12.6 2.58 2.45 
Sharpe ratio 0.0684 0.396 0.436 
 
The momentum effect is weak in Asia Pacific: the WML portfolio earns an average yearly 
return of only 1.75%. The risks of the static momentum strategy are high in this market. The 
return distribution is heavily skewed to the left, and the excess kurtosis, 12.6 is much higher 
than the market excess kurtosis, 2.45. Furthermore, the strategy lost a whopping 57% of its 
value during a single month in 1998. It is perhaps not surprising that the WML performed 
poorly in the region, due to higher market volatility in general, and the Asian financial crisis of 
1997, which caused a major momentum crash. The risk-managed momentum portfolio earned 
an average yearly return of 10.1% - almost six times higher than the static momentum portfolio. 
The Sharpe ratio improves from 0.0684 to 0.396. The return distribution is much less skewed 
and the kurtosis is much lower compared to the static momentum portfolio. The largest monthly 
loss is reduced to 32.9%. The risk-managed momentum strategy does not outperform the market 
portfolio based on the Sharpe ratio, due to a higher standard deviation. But the return 
distribution is less skewed, while the kurtosis is the same as that of the market. The fact that the 
risk-managed momentum strategy worked well in Asia Pacific, where the momentum effect is 
weak, is interesting since it means that the risk-managed strategy also works in markets where 
momentum is less successful. 
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5 Conclusion 
With this essay, I have analyzed momentum in the European stock market over the last quarter 
century. A momentum effect was found in Europe - the winner minus loser portfolio earns 
significantly positive abnormal returns. The strategy performed poorly in the second subsample 
period, 2000:01-2009:12. A momentum crash was observed in 2009, which wiped out the 
previous decade’s earnings. The European momentum crash of 2009 had many similar features 
with the American momentum crash which was discussed in Daniel & Moskowitz (2016). The 
momentum portfolio crashed when the market rebounded because the loser portfolio, which the 
strategy short-sells, rose dramatically in value.  
I have tested the risk-managed momentum strategy of Barroso & Santa-Clara (2015), which 
targets a constant volatility by dynamically scaling the exposure to momentum. Risk 
management greatly improves the performance of momentum in Europe – the Sharpe ratio is 
doubled. The main problems of momentum: time-varying volatility, high excess kurtosis and 
left-skewed return distribution, are solved with a risk-managed strategy. The risk-managed 
strategy improves performance in turbulent periods as well as calmer periods. The Sharpe ratio 
is improved in all the subsamples tested. The largest economic gain from the risk-managed 
strategy comes from avoiding momentum crashes in times of increased volatility. Risk 
management works internationally as well: the Sharpe ratio is improved in both the North 
American equity market and the Asian Pacific equity market. The strategy is implementable in 
real time as it only relies on information available at the turn of every month. For the investor, 
following a strategy where the volatility is held constant by dynamically changing weights 
should be more attractive than following a strategy with a fixed weight, which allows the 
volatility to vary with time. The risk-managed momentum strategy is therefore an interesting 
choice for investors looking to profit from momentum, while avoiding the crash risk of 
traditional momentum strategies.  
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